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I. ARGUMENI' 
A. THE DISTRICT CCXJRT ERRED WHEN IT Dm'ERMINED THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOI' INVADE 
THE PROVINCE OF THE L.Ex;ISLATURE. 
Searcy incorporates his Brief of Appellant in its entirety into his Reply 
Brief of Appellant. 
1 As Defendants (hereinafter collectively identified as "IIX:X:") would have 
us believe, their authority to make rules which raise revenue through phone 
and commissary sales corrmissions, medical co-pays and photocopy assessments 
is implied somewhere under the umbrella of their general authority to have the 
control, direction and management of the penitentiaries. Respondents' Brief, 
pgs. 1 0-39. This argument begs the Court to ignore the overwhelming body of 
Idaho constitutional and statutory law, and its interpretation by this Court, 
that says the power to raise revenue is not implied, but must be expressly and 
specifically granted by the legislature and that ultimately, the power to raise 
revenue comes from the legislature. IIX~ argues that "the district court 
correctly determined that Defendants did not invade the province of the 
legislature." Respondents' Brief, pgs. 10-39. IIX:X:'s argument is flawed, and 
the District Court erred. 
1 The named Defendants are the IDAHO ST?l.TE BOARD OF CORR'ECI'IOO ("ISBOC"), 
the IDA'HO DEPARTMENT OF CORR'ECI'ION ( "IIX:X:11 ) , CAROLYN MELINE ( "Meline II) , JIM 
TIBBS ("Tibbs"), JAY NIELSEN ("Nielsen"), ROBIN SA.NOY ("Sandy"), ANNA JANE 
DRESSEN ("Dressen") , BRE'NT 'REINKE ("Reinke"), l?~M SONNEN ("Sonnen"), TONY 
MEATI'E ( 11Meatte"), SUSAN FUJINAGA ("Fujinaga"), THID LOiJE ("Lowe"), and 
SHIRLEY AUDE'NS ("Aud.ens"), and are sued in their official capacities and as 
State employees. 
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Article II of the Idaho Constitution is titled Distribution of Powers and 
provides: 
§ 1 • Departments of government 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging 
to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed 
or permitted. 
As set forth in Searcy's Brief of Appellant at pgs. 17-20, provision after 
provision of Idaho's Constitution sets forth that the power to raise revenue 
and appropriate funds, whether through taxes, fees or other means, ultimately 
derives from and lies exclusively with the legislature and pursuant to its~duly 
enacted laws. It is the legislative branch, not the executive or judicial 
branches, that is exclusively responsible for the raising of revenue for the 
state of Idaho. 
"The Constitution of the state of Idaho and this Court, through its 
interpretation in the cases cited herein, have clearly established that the 
legislative power was vested in the legislature." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 
660, 664, 791 P.2d 410 (1990). "The courts [and executive] may not substitute 
their own wisdom and policy for the Legislature's." Idaho Gold Dredging Co. 
v. 1:3.3.lderston, 58 Idaho 692, 717, 78 P.2d 105, 116 (1938); Troutner v. 
Kempthome, 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006). 
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred 
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to 
any other body or authority." Mead, 117 Idaho at 665, 791 P.2d 410. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has consistently held that administrative rules or regulations 
are "less that the equivalent of statutory law." Id. 
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"While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the 
legislature (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15), the legislature may 
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means 
and the time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that 
end may prescribe suitable rules and regulations." Id., at 664. "However, 
while these rules and regulations may be given the 'force and effect of law,' 
they do not rise to the level of statutory law." Id. "[W]hat the legislature 
delegated was not a legislative or law making authority, but, an authority to 
make rules or regulations." Mead, 117 Idaho at 665. 
Further, this Court "has consistently found the executive rule making 
authority to be rooted in a legislative delegation, not a power constitutionally 
granted to the executive." Mead, 117 Idaho at 667. 
IJJCX:'s whole case boils down to their assertion that their authority to 
raise the revenue at issue is implied under the umbrella of their "express 
constitutional and statutory authority to control, direct and manage the 
correctional facilities, Idaho Constitution, Article X, § 5, Idaho Code§ 20-
209, as well as express statutory authority to adopt rules and regulations for 
the government and discipline of the correctional facilities. Idaho Code 
§ 20-244." (R, p. 556). 
Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 1, does provide that " penal 
institutions ••• shall be established and supported by the state in such manner 
as may be prescribed by law." It "is a direction to establish the institution, 
and authorizes state support but does not make such support exclusive nor 
prescribe how or from what sources the necessary funds shall be obtained, but 
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leaves that to the legislature." State ex rel. Macey v. Johnson, 50 Ida..•10 363, 
368, 296 P. 588, 589 (1931) (emphasis added). 
By its own terms, the provision of Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 5 
granting "control, direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state" 
is limited by the phrase "with such compensation, powers and duties as may be 
prescribed by law." However, rather than "leaving it to the legislature," IlX)C 
has chosen to independently establish the state's policy by itself and has 
created a revenue raising scheme that is utterly without legislative authority. 
IlX)C is essentially asking the Court to do two things, both of which the 
Court cannot do. 
First, by arguing that the phrase "this board shall have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state" somehow gives IlX)C 
exclusive and self-executing powers, Defendants are asking the Court to give 
no effect to and to read out of the constitution the latter phrase of "with 
such compensation, powers and duties as may be prescribed by law." The phrase 
"as shall be prescribed by law" means that "the powers ••• [are] statutory and 
limited, and that such boards can only exercise those powers granted them by 
statute." Fenton v. Board of Comm'rs, 20 Idaho 392, 404, 119 P. 41, 45 (1911). 
Second, IIXlC is asking the Court to read into the words "control, direction 
and management" an exclusive, self-executing and unlimited power to raise revenue 
in any way it sees fit. 
The Court should not do either of these two things. 
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Ir::x::>C's arguments miss the whole p:)int of Searcy's case. It is not a 
challenge to their control, direction and management of the penal system. 
Rather, it challenges their authority and p:)Wer to independently raise revenue 
in light of Idaho's constitutional and statutory scheme. 
Ir::x::>C's revenue raising scheme violates Idaho Constitution, Article II, 
Section 1. It violates and exceeds the scope of authority granted under Idaho 
Constitution, Article X, Sections 1 and 5. The district court erred by ruling 
otherwise. 
1 • The District Court Erred When it Determined That The Revenue at Issue 
Are Valid Fees Rather Than Taxes. 
Ir::x::>C argues that the district court correctly determined that the funds 
at issue are not unconstitutional taxes. Resp:)ndents' Brief, pgs. 13-15. Ir::x::>C 
admits it does not have the authority to levy taxes (see Resp:)ndents' Brief 
at pg. 13), but then attempts to analogize, erroneously, that their revenue 
raising scheme is the equivalent to valid p:)lice p:)Wer regulatory fees. Id., 
e.g., at pgs. 13-15 and 18-20. Ir::x::>C is incorrect, and the District Court erred. 
a. Ir::x::>C's Revenue Raising Scheme Is Not A Valid Police Power 
Regulatory Fee. 
The p:)Wer to raise revenue lies exclusively with the legislature. Idaho's 
Constitution, Article VII, Section 2, provides that "[t]he legislature shall 
provide such revenue as may be needful." This section "corrmands the legislature 
to provide such revenue as may be needful ••• and applies particularly to revenue 
for state pllrp:)ses." Fenton v. Board of Cormn'rs, 20 Idaho 392, 399, 119 P. 
41 , 43 ( 1911 ) • 
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Idaho Constitution Article VII, Section 6, sets forth that the "legislature 
may by law invest in the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the 
power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation." This 
provision "allows the legislature to invest in the [municipal] corporate 
authorities the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation." Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, __ , 786 P.2d 765, 
766 (1989). 
However, "the grant of taxing power to cities is not self-executing or 
unlimited. It is limited by what taxing power the legislature authorizes in 
its implementing legislation." Id., citing Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 
109 Idaho 424, 427, 708 P.2d 147, 150 (1985). 
Idaho Constitution Article XII, Section 2, sets forth that any "county 
or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such 
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with the general laws." "Municipalities under art. 12 § 2 are 
empowered to enact regulations for the furtherance of the public health, safety, 
morals or welfare of its residents." Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 
at __ , 786 P. 2d at 767 ( citations omitted). "Such police power regulation 
may provide for the collection of revenue incidental to the enforcement of that 
regulation." Id. (citations omitted). Entities such as state agencies and 
and municipalities that are statutorily empowered to carry out police powers 
may impose regulatory fees in accomplishing their directives. Lochsa Falls, 
LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 (2009). However, this authority does 
not impart the ability to tax. Id. Even fees imposed as regulations under 
police powers must meet a test of reasonableness and be rationally related to 
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the cost of enforcing the regulations at hand. Id. 
rocx:'s argument that the revenue at issue in this case constitutes a valid 
police power regulatory fee fails for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost is the obvious: a municipal corporation actually enjoys 
specific constitutional and statutory provisions which grant both the taxing 
power and the police power to impose fees, subject to the specific powers 
invested in it by the legislature. See, e.g., Idaho Constitution, Article VII, 
Section 6; Article XII, Section 2; Idaho Code~ 63-2201A (specific statutory 
grant of power to "impose and cause to be collected fees for those services 
provided by that district which would otherwise be funded by ad valorem tax 
revenues"); Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho at __ , 786 P.2d at 766. 
Conversely, IDOC enjoys no specific constitutional grant of taxing nor 
fee assessing power. See Id. Const. Art. X, §§ 1 and 5. Nor can IDOC point 
to any specific statute granting them either "tax" or "fee" authority pertaining 
to commissary, phones, medical co-pays or photocopying. Thus, their municipal 
"tax/fee" analogy is flawed. 
IDOC asks this Court to take particular notice of the Court's ruling 
regarding the regulatory authority of the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") 
in the case of Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 247 P.3d 666 (2011). See 
Respondents' Brief, at pgs. 18-20 ("The reasoning of the Court in Vickers is 
especially persuasive in the instant case[.}"). 
Searcy agrees. This Court should closely examine and compare the legal 
authority of ITD to impose police power regulatory fees in deciding the instant 
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case. D::>ing so will disclose that n:x:x::::' s reliance on Vickers is misplaced and 
that the existence of ITO's specific statutory fee authority (and Irxx::::'s lack 
thereof) makes the central argument of Searcy's claims in this case: That the 
power to raise revenue is not implied, but must be expressly and specifically 
granted by the legislature. Thus, Irxx::::'s raising of revenue through phone and 
cormnissary sales commissions, medical co-pays and photocopy, fees, without 
specific statutory authority to do so, is invalid and must be struck by this 
Court. 
The ITO has specific statutory authority to assess and collect fees whereas 
Irxx:::: does not. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 49-202 (setting forth numerous specific fees); 
40-311(1) (mandating ITO acquire via fees real property, rights-of-way, easements 
and other rights and rights of direct access); 40-313(3) (mandating ITO acquire, 
maintain and improve, via fees, areas adjacent to highways). Pursuant to the 
specific statutory authority for fees under these and other statutes, ITO 
promulgated the "Rules Governing Highway Right-of-Way Encroachments on State 
Rights-of-Way," IDAPA 39.03.42 et seq. At IDAPA 39.03.42.700, ITO promulgated 
its rules for application fees. The Rules specifically limit ITO so that "Fees 
for applications for permits shall be based on the Department's cost to produce 
the permit and administer the program." See IDAPA 39.03.42.700.01. 
"If municipal regulations are to be held validly enacted under the police 
power, funds generated thereby must bear some reasonable relationship to the 
cost of enforcing the regulation." Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 
at __ , 786 P.2d at 767 (citations omitted). "A license that is imposed for 
revenue is not a police regulation, but a tax, and can only be upheld under 
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the power of taxation." Id., citing State v. Nelsen, 36 Idaho 713, 722, 213 
P. 358, 361 (1923). "This power may not be resorted to as a shield or 
subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a revenue-raising ordinance or 
statute." Id., citing Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 218-219, 118 
P.2d 721, 728 (1941). 
A fee asserted to be raised under the police power is invalid if "it is 
either in conflict with the general laws of the state, unreasonable or 
arbitrary." Potts Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water District, 141 
Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8 (2005) (citation omitted}. ''Whether or not an 
ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary is a question of law." Id. 
In Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 
890 P.2d 326 ( 1995), this Court struck the ordinance at issue there because 
there was "nothing in the ordinance which in any way limits the use of the 
revenue created." Id., at 743. "This is antithetical to this Court's definition 
of a fee." Id. "[A] fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to 
the particular customer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public 
at large to meet public needs." Id., citing Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 
115 Idaho at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. "The ordinance the City enacted states that 
the fees will be used for all public facility infrastructures, which again 
illustrates a shift from develop:nent creating the demand to the public at large." 
Id. "[T]he fee is not collected to pay for the individual services associated 
with a new building, but is for the public at large." Id. "This is clearly 
a revenue raising measure, not a regulation." Id., at 744. 
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"The City argues that Brewster and Alpert stand for the proposition that 
a charge for a direct public service to a user or consumer is not a tax. 
However, their reliance on these opinions is misplaced. These cases state that 
taxes serve the purpose of providing funding for public services at large, 
whereas a fee serves only the purpose of covering the cost of the particular 
service provided by the state to the individual." Id., at 744, citing Alpert 
v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136, 145, 795 P.2d 298, 307 (1990) (quoting 
Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767). 
b. IIX:lC' s Revenue Raising Scheme roes Not Pass the Two-Part I.oomis 
Test For Valid Police Power Regulatory Fees. 
In I.oomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), this 
Court articulated a two-part test to determine the propriety of a fee. First, 
the Court must determine whether the fee constitutes an impermissible tax. 
Secondly, the Court must determine whether the fee is appropriately and 
reasonably assessed. Id., at 437, 807 P.2d at 1275. Under the first step of 
the analysis, the court considers whether, on its face, the fee is a tax or 
a regulation. If it at least appears to be a regulation, the Court then reaches 
the question of whether or not it is reasonably related to the regulated 
activity. If it is not reasonably related to the regulation, then it is purely 
a revenue raising assessment, and once again is not permissible without a 
specific legislative enactment. Id. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that IIOC's revenue raising scheme 
may be analogized and considered under a municipal tax/fee analysis, which it 
can't because IIOC has no specific statutory authority to impose either taxes 
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or fees, their scheme doesn't survive the two-part test that this Court 
articulated in Loomis. 
c. IIXX;'s Revenue Raising Scheme is a Tax and Fails the First Part 
of the Loanis Test. 
The revenue raised by IIXX::: from comrnissary and phone sales comrnissions, 
medical co-pays and photocopying operates as an excise tax, which "includes 
every form of charge imposed by public authority for the purpose of raising 
revenue upon the performance of an act, the enjoyment of a privilege, or the 
engaging in an occupation." Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 
692, 708, 78 P.2d 105, 112 (1938). It operates as a sales tax because it is 
imposed at a fixed rate on the sale of goods. As the Court stated in Starr 
v. Governor, 148 N.H. 72, 802 A.2d 1227, 2002 N.H. Lexis 93 (N.H. Supreme Court 
2002), the commissary surcharge there "neither funds the maintenance, overhead 
or operation of the commissary, nor reimburses the prison for providing a 
commissary ••• we hold that the surcharge is a tax." Id., 148 N.H. at 73, 802 
A.2d at 1229. "The only retail transactions subject to the 5% surcharge tax 
are those that take place at the prison comrnissary. There is nothing unique 
about the goods sold at the prison commissary. The only distinction between 
these transactions and other retail transactions is the fact that the sale takes 
place at the State prison. No legitimate reason has been presented to create 
this distinction and therefore such a classification is impermissible." Id., 
148 N.H. at 74, 802 A.2d at 1230. The same applies to the revenue raised by 
IIXX::: from commissary and phone sales comrnissions, medical co-pays and 
photocopying that is the subject of this instant appeal. 
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Thus, the revenue raised by Ir:x::c from commissary and phone sales commissions, 
medical co-pays and photocopying fails the first part of the Loomis test because 
it is operated more along the lines of a tax and therefore requires specific 
legislation. It neither funds the maintenance, overhead or operation of the 
corrmissary, phone system, medical care or photocopy programs, nor reimburses 
the prison for providing these services. 2 Indeed, IIX::C maintains that "[t]here 
is no state law governing what expenditures can be made with IMF monies, and 
it is within the discretion of each IIX::C facility how to spend its :i:ortion of 
the IMF." Res:i:ondents' Brief, at pg. 5. 
Ir:x::c admits that it expends IMF monies on programs completely unrelated 
to the commissary, telephones, medical care and photocopying, including but 
not limited to expenditures for "school materials, library books/ subscriptions, 
recreation, materials for the visiting center, the legal resource center, movies, 
2 IIX::C admits that the "[m]edical co-pay funds [are] de:i:osited in the 
Miscellaneous Revenue Fund." Res:i:ondents' Brief, pg. 7, citing R, p.000567 
at f[11. However, rr:x::c has provided no evidence that these funds ever actually 
find their way back into the General Fund and thereby support IIX::C's claim these 
funds "are used to offset General Fund medical expenses." Id. If the co-pay 
funds are appropriated back to IDOC via the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund rather 
than the General Fund, then they are not an offset to General Funds. Rather, 
they are (according to IDOC) subject to the condition that "[t]here is no state 
law governing what expenditures can be made with IMF monies, and it is within 
the discretion of each Irx>C facility how to spend its :i:ortion of the IMF." 
Res:i:ondents' Brief, at pg. 5. This is not a "General Fund offset," and IIXlC's 
failure to provide evidence that these funds ever go back to the General Fund 
and used only to offset General Fund medical expenses creates a genuine issue 
of material fact and failure of proof which prevents entry of summary judgment 
in favor of Irx>C. 
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cable television, special meals on holidays, etc. In addition, some personnel 
costs for various positions are paid from the IMF including the legal assistant/ 
paralegal in the Legal Resource Center, the correctional officer in the 
Recreation Department, the Religious Activities Coordinator and the Financial 
Specialist who monitors the IMF." (R, p. 000316-317 at ,i:15). 
There is nothing unique about the goods sold at the prison. The only 
distinction between these transactions and other retail transactions is the 
fact that the sale takes place at the State prison. No legitimate reason has 
been presented to create this distinction. The Court should find that II:X:X:::' s 
revenue scheme constitutes an illegal tax. See Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n 
v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 744, 890 P.2d 326, 330 (1995) (this 
Court striking down a municipal "fee," finding it operated more along the lines 
of a general tax and therefore required specific legislative authorization, 
was for the benefit of the public at large, and there was no way to control 
how the collected fees were spent by the city); Starr v. Governor, 148 N.H. 
72, 802 A.2d 1227, 2002 N.H. Lexis 93 (N.H. Supreme Court 2002) (holding the 
commissary surcharge there is a tax). 
d. ~' s Revenue Raising Scheme Is Not A Valid Police ~ 
Regulatory Fee And Also Fails the Second Part of the ux:mis 
Test. 
The revenue raised by IIXX::: from canrnissary and phone sales commissions, 
medical co-pays and photocopying also fails the second part of the Loomis test, 
the determination of "whether the fee is appropriately and reasonably assessed." 
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho at 437, 807 P.2d at 1275. "In addition 
to having a regulatory purpose, a municipal fee must be reasonably and rationally 
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related to the regulatory purpose." Potts Construction Company v. North Kootenai 
Water District, 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8 (2005) (citation omitted). The 
police power fee is invalid if "it is either in conflict with the general laws 
of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. (citation omitted). "Whether 
or not an ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary is a question of law." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
As an initial matter, IDOC's revenue raising scheme is in conflict with 
the general laws of the state. M.nnicipal corporations enjoy both specific 
constitutional and statutory authority to impose legislatively authorized taxes 
and fees. Id. Const. Art. VII,§ 6; Art. XII,§ 2, I.C. § 63-2201A. Likewise, 
the ITD enjoys specific statutory authority to impose fees. See, e.g., I.e. 
§§ 49-202, 40-311(1), and 40-313(3). But IDOC can point to no constitutional 
or statutory authority which specifically grants them this same power. By this 
alone IDOC fails the second part of the Loomis test. 
IDOC's revenue raising scheme from commissary and phone sales commissions, 
medical co-pays and photocopying also has no regulatory purpose, and the revenue 
raised is not reasonably and rationally related to a regulatory purpose. Nothing 
limits IDOC's use of the fnnds raised. Indeed, IDOC maintains that "[t]here 
is no state law governing what expenditures can be made with IMF monies, and 
it is within the discretion of each IDOC,facility how to spend its portion of 
the IMF." Respondents' Brief, at pg. 5. 
IDOC admits that it expends IMF monies on programs completely unrelated 
to the commissary, telephones, medical care and photocopying, including but 
not limited to expenditures for "school materials, library books/ subscriptions, 
recreation, materials for the visiting center, the legal resource center, movies, 
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cable television, s-pecial meals on holidays, etc. In addition, some personnel 
costs for various positions are paid from the IMF including the legal assistant/ 
paralegal in the Legal Resource Center, the correctional officer in the 
Recreation Department, and Religious Activities Coordinator and the Financial 
S-pecialist who monitors the IMF." (R, p. 000316-317 at ,I15). 
Thus, ~'s fees are in conflict with the general laws of the state and, 
as a matter of law, are unreasonable and arbitrary. They fail the second part 
of this Court's articulated test applied to municipal taxes and fees. These 
expenditures mee<t public needs wholly unrelated to regulating the prison's phone 
system, commissary, medical system and photocopying program. IDOC's revenue 
raising scheme from commissary and phone sales commissions, medical co-pays 
and photocopying are invalid and must be struck by this Court. 
2. The District Court erred in concluding that the commissions charged 
for telephone time and commissary gcx:,ds are funds arising fran the 
sale of goods or services under I.C. § 67-3611 where, under the 
applicable summary judgment standards, IlXJC had the burden of 
satisfying all of the elements of their affinnative statutory defense 
and failed to do so. 
IDOC also argues that "the district court correctly determined that the 
legislature contemplated that penal institutions may sell goods and services 
and expend the funds arising from the sale of the same for the maintenance, 
use and support of the institution." Respondents' Brief, pgs. 34-39. IDOC 
is incorrect, and the district court erred. 
'P£. an affirmative defense that IDOC has the burden of proving all of the 
elements of at trial, IDOC asserted, and the district court erroneously 
concluded, that the phone and commissary revenue was raised under the authority 
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of I.C. § 67-3611. (R, p.503; pp.514, Ls.20 - 517, Ls.22). As the nonmoving 
party to Searcy' s surrnnary judgment motion, II::X:): did not meet the burden of their 
defense. "Summary judgment must be entered against the nonmoving party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element, 
which is essential to his case and upon which he will bear the burden of proof 
at trial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 39, 
28 P.3d 380 (2001) (citations omitted). "If the nonmoving party cannot make 
a showing on elements essential to his claims, "there can be no genuine issue 
of material fact since a canplete failure of proof concerning an essential element 
of. the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts irrnnaterial."" 
Id. (citation omitted). 
a. The Essential Elements of I.C. § 67-3611. 
The provisions of I.C. § 67-3611 are specifically limited by the terms 
of Idaho Code Section 67-3602, which provides: 
67-3602. PAYMENT OF SALARIES AND WAGES. No portion of any appropriation 
made for expenses other than salaries and wages shall be expended in payment 
of salaries and wages; but with the consent of the state board of examiners, 
any portion of any appropriation made for the payment of salaries and wages 
may be expended for other expenses of the particular office or institution 
for which it is appropriated. 
Therefore, by its own terms, I.C. § 67-3611 requires that in order for 
funds to be construed to be raised pursuant to the statute, the following 
essential elements must be satisfied: 
(a) that "no portion of any appropriation made for expenses other than 
salaries and wages shall be expended in payment of salaries and wages" 
(see I.C. § 67-3602); 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 16 
(b) that "such sums received shall be deposited with the state treasurer" 
and "so received in the general fund of the state;" and that "the 
sums of money so received are hereby appropriated from the general 
fund of the state;" and 
(c) that the funds must arise "from the sale of services ••• or other 
goods, or article 'produced within or by the institution[.]'" Id. 
(emphasis added). 
See I.C. ~ 67-3611. 
b. ICXX::: has failed to make a showing of the essential elements of 
their I.C. § 67-3611 defense. 
i. I~ has failed to show that no portion of the funds raised 
by the telephone and comnissary comnissions were "expended 
in the payment of salaries and wages." 
This is an essential element that I~ is required to prove at trial in 
asserting their I.C. § 67-3611 defense. See I.C. § 67-3602. They have not 
done so. 
Indeed, the documents sul:mitted to the Court by I~ in the cross-motion 
summary judgment proceedings actually indicate the opposite - that the funds 
are in fact being "expended in payment of salaries and wages." (See, R, pp.316-
317 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens ,i: 15 ("In addition, some personnel costs for 
various positions are paid fran the It1F including the legal assistant/paralegal 
in the Resource Center, the correctional officer in the Recreation Department, 
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the Religious Activities Coordinator and the Financial Specialist who monitors 
the IMF."))). 
The scope of the allegation in Searcy's Civil Complaint, at Paragraph 35, 
that IDOC "illegally diverted moneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands 
of other persons for IDOC uses, without express constitutional or statutory 
authority to do so, through phone and corrmissary sales corrmissions" (R, p.030, 
at ,r 35) squarely challenges all aspects of the legality of IDOC's phone and 
cormnissary revenue. 
IDOC has failed to show the essential element that the funds raised through 
telephone and commissary revenue were not "expended in payment of salaries and 
wages." See I.e.§§ 67-3602; 67-3611. 
ii. IIXX::: has failed to show that the fl.filds received are deposited 
"in the general fund" and appropriated "from the general 
fund. II 
This is also an essential element that IDOC is required to prove at trial 
in asserting their I.C. § 67-3611 defense. They have not done so. 
Indeed, the documents sul:::rnitted to the Court by IDOC in the cross-motion 
surmnary judgment proceedings actually indicate that the funds were not received 
in and appropriated from the General Fund. Rather, IDOC's own submissions 
indicate that the telephone and cormnissary revenue was received in and 
appropriated from the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund. (See, R, p.195, at mt 4-5 
(Statement of Material Facts, at ,r 4 ("The IDOC is funded primarily from the 
State General Fund. Other funding sources include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, endowment income, cost of supervision fees, inmate labor, federal 
grants, and miscellaneous revenue. See Affidavit of Shirley Audens [R, pp.316], 
,t12.") and at~ 5 ("The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, which makes up part of the 
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annual budget appropriated by the legislature for the operation of the state 
correction system, includes money from the inmate management fund (IMF). The 
IMF is made up of money that is collected by the IOOC and deposited in the state 
treasury. CUrrently, as set forth in IlXlC SOP 114.03.03.014 (Revenue: Offender 
Management Fund), the source of these monies includes, but is not limited to: 
telephone revenue; commissary revenue; vending revenue; laundry revenue; donation 
revenue; and social security revenue. See Aff of SA, [R, pp.316] ~14. See 
also Civil Complaint, ,T,137, 52.")). 
While IIXlC may argue that it is the duty of the state controller and/or 
state treasurer to ensure the funds flow in an out of the General Fund instead 
of the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund (See I.C. § 67-3611), there are two important 
problems with this argument, both of which lie squarely upon IlXlC rather than 
the state controller or treasurer. 
First and foremost, IlXlC's hands are not clean in the matter. Indeed, 
IlXlC Financial Specialist Sr. Shirley Audens testified at~ 8 of her affidavit 
that even though it is supposedly "the p:::>licy of the Board of Correction that 
the IDOC shall manage its financial responsibilities in accordance with ••• 
the laws of the State of Idaho" (R, p.314, at~ 8), it is also IlXlC's own policy 
to "deposit incoming funds from the following sources into the State of Idaho 
miscellaneous revenue fund ••• Telephone revenue [and] Cormnissary revenue." 
(R, p.360 (Exhibit F of Affidavit of Shirley Audens (IOOC SOP 114.03.03.014 
(Revenue: Offender Management Fund), GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, at Section 1. Incoming 
Funds, at pg. 3 of 8 (emphasis added)))). This is specifically contrary to 
"the laws of the State of Idaho" if this money is raised pursuant to LC. § 
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67-3611. Thus, it is IOOC themselves who are res];X)nsible for depositing the 
the telephone and commissary revenue into the ~iscellaneous Revenue Fund rather 
than the General Fund in the first place. 
Second, to the extent that the state controller and/or state treasurer 
are liable and must be brought into the suit as Third-Parties, IDOC has failed 
to canply with Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding Third-
Party Practice. 
If IIOC wishes to blame the fact that the phone and commissary revenue 
flows in and out of the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund rather than the General 
Fund on the state controller and/or state treasurer, they are free to do so 
and Rule 14(a) provides them the procedural doorway. But to date, they have 
not met their own res];X)nsibility to request leave to do this. Regardless, 
whether IIOC makes the state controller and/or state treasurer Third-Parties 
or not, IIOC still has the burden of proving the existence of every essential 
element of their I.C. § 67-3611 defense. 
The "General Fund" remains an essential element at trial to IOOC' s r.c. 
§ 67-3611 defense. Searcy is not being hypertechnical. Rather, he is arguing 
the literal words of the statute, a fundamental of statutory construction. 
IOOC has failed to show the essential element that the funds raised through 
telephone and commissary revenue are received in, and appropriated from, the 
General Fund. 
iii. IOOC has failed to show that the telephone and carmissary 
funds arise "from the sale of services, ••• or other goods, 
or article 'produced within or by the institution. '" 
An essential element of Idaho Code Section 67-3611 that must be satisfied 
by IOOC is that the telephone and commissary funds must arise "from the sale 
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of services, ••• or other goods, or article 'produced within or by the 
institution."' IDClC has failed to do so. 
Statutory construction must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg' 1 Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). 
The plain, usual and ordinary meaning of the word "produce" is "to make 
or manufacture [to pro:iuce steel]." Webster's New World Dictionary of the 
American Language, Second College "Edition (1984). 
rrxx::: set forth in their cross-m::>tion summary judgment submissions that 
they "allow the use of telephones to imBtes based on security needs and 
resources." (R, p.317, at~ 18 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at ,i: 18)). However, 
rrxx::: has not put forth any eviden~e that this allowed use of telephones is, 
in fact, a service "produced" (i.e., "made or manufactured") "within :::,r by the 
institution." tbcuments submitted by IDClC actually indicate otherwise - that 
this telephone service is merely brought into the institution (as opposed to 
"produced within or by the institution") from the outside by a contract telephone 
vendor. (R, p.317, at !f[ 18 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at 'f[ 18 (IMF "is 
partially comprised of funds from telephone revenue, which is the corrmission 
agreed up:m by the IDX and the telephone vendor.") ) ) • 
Likewise, IDClC set forth in their cross-motion summary jud~t submissions 
that a general description of the commissary goods is "the allowed food products, 
medical, dental, and gro:::,ming items, and electronic equiµnent not provided by 
the Department of Correction but approved for use." 
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(R, p.317, at ,r 17 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens ,r 17 (See, R, p.388 (Exhibit H), 
Policy 406, at pg. 3) ) ) • However, no: has not put forth any evidence that 
these items are, in fact, "produced" (i.e., "made or manufactured") "within 
or by the institution." Documents sul:mi.tted by IIX::>C indicate otherwise - that 
these articles are merely brought into the institution (as opposed to "produced" 
within or by the institution) by a contract commissary vendor. (R, p.317, at 
,r 17 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens ,r 17 (IMF "is partially comprised of funds 
from commissary revenue, which is the contracted sales percentage commission 
agreed upon by the IIX::>C and the commissary vendor."))). 
The question is whether the phrase in I.C. ~ 67-3611 of "produced within 
or by the institution" only modifies the word "article" or, as Searcy asserts, 
modifies the entire list of items preceding that term (i.e., "the sale of 
services, rentals or personal property, stock, farm or garden produce, or other 
goods, or article" produced within or by the institution). 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." BHC Inter:m:mntain Hospital, Inc. v. Ada County, 150 
Idaho 93, 95, 244 P.3d 237 (2010) (citation omitted). 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of 
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; 
and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Ada 
County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 353, 
298 P.3d 245 (2013) (citing Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506. "A 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 22 
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction." Id., at 353 ( citation omitted). 
The Court "must look to the grarnnatical construction of the statute as 
the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to generally 
accepted principles of English grarnnar." State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 
914, 538 P.2d 263 (1975) (citation omitted). "When punctuation discloses a 
proper legislative intent or conveys a clear meaning the courts should give 
weight to it as evidence." 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction~ 47:15 (5th 
ed. 1992). ''where a sentence contains several antecedents and several 
consequents they are to be read distributively." Id., at§ 47:26. 
Here, the correct reading of I.C. § 67-3611 is that the phrase "produced 
within or by the institution," modifies the entire phrase "the sale of services, 
rentals of personal property, stock, farm or garden produce, or other goods, 
or article" and does not only modify the word "article." Under this correct 
reading, the phrase provides for both the literal statutory wording intent, 
and the legislative intent, that "the funds arising from the sale of" shall 
limit such sales of "services, rentals of personal property, stock, farm or 
garden produce, or other goods, or article" to those "produced within or by 
the institution." 
Otherwise, if the phrase "produced within or by the institution" is read 
to only modify "article," then "the sale of services, rentals of personal 
property, stock, farm or garden produce, or other goods," would be virtually 
unlimited; but "article," and only "article," would have any limits whatsoever, 
those being that the article must be "produced within or by the institution." 
This would lead to an ambiguous, confusing and absurd result. However, this 
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can be reconciled with the correct view that the intent of the drafters should 
prevail by assuming that the legislature would never have intended such a result. 
Thus, the correct reading of I.C. § 67-3611 is that the phrase "produced within 
or by the institution," modifies the entire phrase "the sale of services, rentals 
of personal pro:perty, stock, farm or garden produce, or other goods, or article." 
An essential element of Idaho Code Section 67-3611 that must be satisfied 
by IDOC is that the sale of services or goods must be from goods or services 
"produced within or by the institution." IDOC has failed to do so. 
"surrmary judgment must be entered against the nonmoving party who fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish existence of an element, which is 
essential to his case and upon which he will bear the burden of proof at trial." 
McGilvray, 136 Idaho at 42, 28 P.3d at 383 (citations omitted). "If the 
nonmoving party cannot make a showing on elements essential to his claims, "there 
can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders 
all other facts immaterial."" Id., at 42 (citation omitted). 
Respectfully, Searcy is entitled to summary judgment in his favor and the 
district court erred ruling otherwise. 
3. The District Court Erred by Ruling that "Any Claim Made By Plaintiff 
That The Fees In Question Should Have Been Prarrulgated As Rules 
Pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, Is Moot." 
Idaho Code Section 20-212(a) provides in pertinent part that the "state 
board of correction shall make all necessary rules to carry out the provisions 
of this chapter not inconsistent with express statutes or the state 
constitution[.]" Nowhere in this statute does it state that IDOC may raise 
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revenue for IIXC purposes outside of Idaho's constitutionally provided 
legislative process, or that IIXC may collect commissions or assess monetary 
charges for services rendered to inmates. 
The district court found that "the record does not currently establish 
which, if any, of the policies or procedures imposing the fees which are the 
subject of this case were enacted via the rule-making procedure set forth in 
I.C. § 20-212." R, p.519, Ls.11-13. The district court ordered supplemental 
briefing of both parties "on the issue of legislative review of the specific 
policies or procedures requiring the collection of the fees remaining in this 
case." R, p.519, Ls.19-20. Only then did IIXC finally admit that the "IIXC 
policies and procedures imposing the fees at issue in this case (IIXC SOP 
405.02.01.001, IIXC Policy 411, IIXC SOP 411.06.03.001, IIXC Policy 608, and 
IIXC SOP 608.02.00.001) were not promulgated in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in Idaho Code§ 20-212[.]" R, p.551. 
It is against these findings and backdrop of procedural history that the 
district court ultimately ruled, taking sua sponte judicial notice of IIXC's 
3 new IDAPA Rules, that: 
"[I]n the time since the filing of this Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order on June 13, 2012, IDAPA Rules have been promulgated setting the IIXC 
fee structure, including the hobby craft surcharge, the photocopy fee, 
and the medical co-pay fee" and concluded that "[b]ecause the Defendants 
have taken remedial action to promulgate IDAPA rules subject to legislative 
3 IIXC's new IDAPA Rules 
effect on November 2, 2012, 
judgment briefing on August 
subject matter of either of 
06.01.01.013 (Department Fee Structure) went into 
after IIXC submitted their supplemental summary 
6, 2012 (R, pp.000524 - 000643); they were not the 
the parties' summary judgment submissions. 
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oversight, the court finds now that the hobby craft surcharge, the photocopy 
fee, and the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the separation of 
powers between the executive and legislative branches of state government 
pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article II, Section 1 • In addition, the 
Court finds that any claim made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question 
should have been promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, is moot." 
R, p.734, Ls.15-17 and 21-24 - p.735, Ls.2. 
Respectfully, Searcy's claims under I.C. § 20-212 are not moot and the 
district court erred. 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial decree of 
specific releif." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255 (2011). 
The district court's sua sponte taking of judicial notice of the November 2, 
2012 IDAPAs (Rules 06.01.01.013)was error. When a court takes sua sponte 
judicial notice of any facts, "the proceedings thereafter must comport with 
the hearing and notice requirements of Rule 56." Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 
Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). Instead, the district court 
erred and did not afford Searcy "an opportunity to present material in an effort 
to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed such as would have 
precluded summary judgment." Id., 118 Idaho at 154, 796 P.2d at 277. 
Such a genuine issue of material fact does exist. IIX::C has argued that 
the "fees" at issue are police power regulatory fees. See, e.g., Respondents' 
Brief, at pgs. 13-15 and 18-20. Genuine issues of material fact regarding police 
power regulatory fees are whether: 
(a) they are "imposed for revenue [and therefore] not a police regulation, 
but a tax, and can only be upheld under the power of taxation" 
(Brewster, 115 Idaho at __ , 786 P.2d at 767 (citing State v. Nelsen, 
36 Idaho at 722, 213 P. at 361)); 
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(b) the "power [has been] resorted to as a shield or subterfuge, under 
which to enact and enforce a revenue-raising ordinance or statute" 
(Id., (citing Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 ]jdaho at 218-19; 
(c) "nothing ••• in any way limits the use of the revenue created" (Idaho 
Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho at 743, 
890 P.2d 326); 
(d) it "is clearly a revenue raising measure" (Id., at 744); 
(e) it "serve[s] the purpose of providing funding for public services 
at large [i.e., a tax] [or] serves only the purpose of covering the 
cost of the particular service provided by the state to the individual 
[i.e., a fee]" (Id., at 744, citing Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 
Idaho at 145, 795 P.2d at 307 (quoting Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 
768 P.2d at 767)). 
IIX>C maintains that "[t]here is no state law governing what expenditures 
can be made with IMF monies, and it is within the discretion of each IIX>C 
facility how to spend its portion of the IMF." Respondents' Brief, at pg. 5. 
IIX>C admits that it spends IMF monies on programs canpletely unrelated 
to the corrrnissary, telephones, medical care and photocopying, including but 
not limited to expenditures for "school materials, library books/ subscriptions, 
recreation, materials for the visiting center, the legal resource center, movies, 
cable television, special meals on holidays, etc. In addition, some personnel 
costs for various positions are paid from the IMF including the legal assistant/ 
paralegal in the Legal Resource Center, the correctional officer in the 
Recreation Department, the Religious Activities Coordinator and the Financial 
Specialist who monitors the IMF." R, p.000316-317 at ,-r 15.J 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 27 
These expenditures meet public needs wholly unrelated to regulating the 
prison's phone system, cormnissary, medical system and photocopying program. 
Thus, the district court's sua sponte taking of judicial notice of the 
November 2, 2012 IDAPAs (IDAPA Rules 06.01.01.013), without comporting with 
the hearing and notice requirements of Rule 56, was error. 
Notably, the district court's "mootness" ruling was specifically limited 
to the issue of whether "any claim made by the Plaintiff that the fees in 
question should have been promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, is 
moot." R, p.734, Ls.15-17 and 21-24 - p.735, Ls.2. It did not extend to 
Searcy's broader claim that "the raising of revenue for IIXJC uses by Defendants 
••• through phone and commissary cormnissions, medical co-pay fees [and] 
photocopying fees ••• exceeds and violates the scope of rule making authority 
granted under Idaho Code Section 20-212[.]" (R, p.041 (Civil Complaint at ,-i94)), 
which still "present[s] a real and substantial controversy that is capable of 
being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." State v. Lute, 
150 Idaho at 839, 252 P.3d 1255. 
Further, the issue of whether "any claim made by the Plaintiff that the 
fees in question should have been promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 
20-212," notwithstanding the district court's erroneous ruling, also still 
"present[s] a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded 
through judicial decree of specific relief." Id. 
As discussed above, IIXJC has specifically asked the Court to take particular 
notice of the regulatory authority of the ITD, citing Vickers. Searcy agrees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 28 
Doing so discloses that the I'ID has specific statutory authority to assess 
and collect fees whereas ID'.JC does not. See, e.g., I.e.§§ 49-202, 40-311(1), 
and 40-313(3). 
Further examination of IID's regulatory authority discloses that their 
promulgated "Rules Governing Highway Right-of-Way Encroachments on State Rights-
of-Way," IDAPA Rules 39.03.42 et seq., specifically limit I'ID so that "Fees 
for applications for permits shall be based on the Department's cost to produce 
the permit and administer the program." See IDAPA 39.03.42.700.01. Thus, IID's 
IDAPA regulations actually comply with this Court's requirement that they "must 
bear some reasonable relationship to the cost of enforcing the regulation" 
(Brewster, 115 Idaho at __ , 786 P.2d at 767) and "serves only the purpose of 
covering the cost of the particular service provided by the state to the 
individual" (Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 
at 744, citing Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho at 145, 795 P.2d at 307, 
(quoting Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767)). 
On the other hand, ID'.JC maintains that "[t]here is no state law governing 
what expenditures can be made with IMF monies, and it is within the discretion 
of each facility how to spend its portion of the IMF." Respondents' Brief, 
at pg. 5. 
Thus, an issue still exists (and is not moot), which is capable of being 
concluded through judicial decree of specific relief, as to whether ID'.JC's new 
revenue raising IDAPA rules comply with the requirements of a police power 
regulatory fee. 
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4. In The Alternative, If IIXJC's IDAPA Rules Are An Adequate 
''Remedial Action," Searcy Is Still Entitled 'lb Judgment And 
Damages For The Revenue Raised Prior To November 2, 2012. 
The district court took sua sponte judicial notice that II~ promulgated 
IDAPA Rules effective November 2, 2012. R, p.000734, Ls.15 - p.000735, Ls.2; 
p.000736, Ls.18-24. See Rules of the Board of Correction at IDAPA 06.01.01.013 
Department Fee Structure; see also Appellant's Brief at Addendum A. 
These IDAPAs were only promulgated after and under the pressure of this 
litigation. As set forth above, Searcy disputes that they serve as an adequate 
remedy. However, if this Court holds otherwise, then Searcy is still entitled 
to judgment and damages for the revenue raised prior to November 2, 2012. See, 
Sweeney v. American Nat. Bank, et al., 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109, 111 (1941) 
( "well settled that in a proceeding for declaratory judgment the court has 
jurisdiction ••• to award damages."); Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573, 
887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Ct. App. 1994) (The unjust enrichment doctrine ••• allows 
recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff which 
it would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the 
value of the benefit." (citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 
95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974)). 
The Court should reverse and remand back to the district court for this 
alternative reason also. 
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5. The Fees Irnp'.)sed By I.C. § 20-225 Illustrate The Necessity For Specific 
Statutory Authority For IIXX:'.'s Revenue Raising Scheme In 'rhis Appaal. 
According to rrxx:::, their authority to make rules which raise revenue is 
implied under the umbrella of their general authority to have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries. However, this argument begs 
the Court to ignore the overwhelming body 6.f Idaho constitutional and statutory 
law, and its interpretation by this Court, that says the power to raise revenue 
is not implied, but must be expressly and specifically granted by the legislature 
and that ultimately, the power to raise revenue comes from the legislature. 
IDCC's argument is undermined by the fact that the legislature has provided 
them with express statutory authority for other types of revenue raising and 
monetary assessments. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 20-102A {express statutory authority 
for the penitentiary earnings reserve fund); 20-103 (authority for the 
penitentiary income fund); 20-209D (authority for forfeiture of contraband 
property or money found in possession of inmates); 20-225 (authority for payment 
of cost of supervision under probation and parole); 20-225A (authority for 
interstate compact application fee); 20-241 (authority to accept federal and 
other funds); 20-242 (authority for furloughed prisoners to pay prisoner's board, 
personal expenses, and costs of administering such prisoner's work furlough 
program); and 20-245 (authority to charge offenders performing community service 
work an hourly fee for purposes of providing worker's compensation insurance). 
IDCC's position begs the question why, if they possess the implied 
authority to impose fees upon those in their supervision, is it necessary 
for the legislature to pass these numerous other laws which expressly raise 
revenue for IDCC (e.g., I.e.§§ 20-102A, 20-103, 20-209D, 20-225, 20-225A, 
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20-241, 20-242 and 20-245) if Ir:x:c already has this implied authority? 
The answer to this question is simple: the legislature did not "perform 
an idle act by enacting a meaningless provision." Roberts v. Board of Trustees, 
Pocatello School District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2000). 
Instead, the legislature did what only the legislature can do - it passed laws 
which expressly and specifically raise revenue for Irx:x:: as part of the 
legislature's exclusive constitutional mandate to raise revenue and support 
the state's penal institutions. Ir:x:c's raising of revenue without express 
statutory authority invades the province of the legislature. 
Focusing specifically on I.e.§ 20-225, Ir:x:c argues that their "power is 
not curtailed by Idaho Code§ 20-225, which expressly mentions monetary 
assessments, as the fee authorized by that provision is entirely distinguishable 
from the fees at issue in the instant case." See Respondents' Brief, at pgs. 
30-33. 
Specifically, Irx:x:: asserts that the fees authorized by I.e.§ 20-225 are 
"entirely distinguishable" from the fees at issue in the instant case because 
(1) I.e.§ 20-225 applies to parolees and probationers rather than incarcerated 
offenders (Id., at pg. 31); (2) the fees imposed under§ 20-225 are mandatory 
rather than voluntary decisions on how to spend money (Id.); (3) that§ 20-225 
provides consequences for failure to pay the cost of supervision fees (Id.); 
(4) that§ 20-225 creates a dedicated probation and parole receipts fund for 
the revenue raised under the statute (Id., at pg. 32); and (5) that the purpose 
of the fees imposed under§ 20-225 are to offset costs to the taxpayer of 
supervising adult felons" (Id.). Each of these arguments lack merit, are 
unpersuasive and do not in any way distinguish the fees at issue in the instant 
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case from those imposed by I.C. § 20-225. Indeed, IDOC's own legal positions, 
as set forth in this appeal, illustrate the falsity of their "distinguishing" 
arguments. Searcy will address each of these five (5) arguments in turn. 
First, IDOC attempts to distinguish the fees at issue in this case from 
those imposed by I.e.§ 20-2251:iecause "Idaho Code§ 20-225 relates to collecting 
fees from parolees and probationers who are out in the community and not residing 
in an IIXX; correctional facility." Respondents' Brief, at pg. 31. However, 
IDOC has also asserted that fundamentally their authority derives from a 
constitutional grant of power under Article X, Section 5. This provision does 
not limit the power granted to only the prisons - it also encompasses "adult 
probation and parole." Which begs the question: why, if as IDOC asserts, they 
have the implied power to raise revenue for the prisons under the "control, 
direction and management" clause, do they not also have the same power to raise 
revenue for adult probation and parole, without the express authority of the 
COS statute, under the "adult probation and parole" clause? The answer is that 
IDOC's power is limited to "such compensation, power and duties as may be imposed 
by law" and that an express statute for the COS revenue is required, just as 
it is required for the revenue at issue in this case. 
Second, IDOC attempts to distinguish the fees at issue in the instant case 
from those imposed by I.C. § 20-225 because "Idaho Code§ 20-225 makes payment 
for supervision mandatory[.]" Respondents' Brief, at pg. 31 (emphasis in 
original). 'Ihis is simply false. Parole in Idaho is not mandatory; it is only 
granted under the condition that the parolee voluntarily signs a contract with 
the Commission agreeing "to all general and special conditions of parole." 
See Rules of the Commission of Pardons and Parole, IDAPA 50.01.01.350.04. Thus, 
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like t.11.e revenue at issue here, the offender/parolee is making a voluntary 
decision, by seeking and accepting parole, on how to spend his own money. He 
knows that by making the voluntary decision to accept parole he is also making 
the voluntary decision to subject himself to the statutory COS fees. Further, 
he is also receiving the value of services rendered - he receives parole 
supervision services. See State v. Walker, 126 Idaho 508, 887 P.2d 553 (1994). 
Indeed, the voluntary nature of the offender/parolee's decision to seek 
and accept parole cannot be overstated. Not only does this voluntary decision, 
and only this voluntary decision, expose the parolee to the COS fees in the 
first place, but this singular voluntary decision also exposes the parolee to 
the risk of possible extension of length of his underlying sentence that 
potentially comes, if parole is subsequently revoked, through the forfeiture 
of time served on parole. See I.C. § 20-228; Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 
108 P.3d 417 (2005). Thus, IIX>C's "voluntary/mandatory decision" distinction 
argument fails. 
Third, IIX>C attempts to distinguish the fees at issue in the instant case 
from those imposed by I.C. § 20-225 because "Idaho Code§ 20-225 provides 
consequences for failure to pay the cost of supervision fee, i.e., revocation 
of probation or parole." Respondents' Brief, at pg. 31. However, according 
to IIX>C's own arguments they already have this authority. In the absence of 
the specific authority granted under I.C. § 20-225, their own legal positions 
argue that they could simply make payment of COS fees a condition of parole, 
and violate parole if those conditions are not met. Thus, according to the 
positions staked out by IIX>C, the necessity for the legislature's involvement 
in enacting I.e.§ 20-225 is still unclear. 
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Fourth, IIXJC attempts to distinguish the fees at issue in the instant case 
from those imposed by I.C. § 20-225 because "Idaho Code § 20-225 created a 
dedicated probation and parole receipts revenue fund for the moneys collected 
as costs of supervision." Respondents' Brief, at }?g. 32. However, according 
to IIXJC they already have the authority to create their own dedicated funds 
accounts. See, R, p.000335 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens, Exhibit C (IIXJC SOP 
114.03.03.011 (Inmate Trust Account) at pg. 10 ("All hobby purchases are charged 
a five percent (5%) surcharge that is debited to the G/L Hobby Account. The 
surcharge is automatically posted to the Hobby Account by the Inmate Trust 
Account System."))). 
Fifth, nxx::: attempts to distinguish the fees at issue in the instant case 
from those imposed by I.C. § 20-225 because "[t]he purpose of this legislation 
is to help offset some of the costs to the taxpayer of supervising adult 
felons[.]" Respondents' Brief, at }?g. 32. However, as set forth above, the 
fees at issue in this case are not specifically authorized by a statute, are 
created for raising revenue, may be spent on literally anything IIXJC chooses 
to spend them on, and do not qualify as valid police power regulatory fees. 
Thus, the fees authorized by§ 20-225 are not "entirely distinguishable" 
from the fees at issue in this case. Indeed, every argument made by IIX)C 
to distinguish these fees is negated by the similarities and the implications 
of IIX)C's own arguments and legal positions in this case. 
The Court must be cognizant of the broader implications of IIX)C's arguments. 
Taken to its logical and inevitable conclusion, IIX)C's position would allow 
virtually every executive branch department the implied, unbridled discretion 
to raise revenue under the umbrella of their other substantive powers. 
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Which brings us back to the original question of why, if ID()C possesses 
the implied authority to impose revenue raising fees upon those in their 
supervision, was it necessary for the legislature to pass the numerous other 
laws which expressly raise revenue for ID()C (e.g., I.C. §§ 20-102A, 20-103, 
20-209D, 20-225, 20-225A, 20-241, 20-242 and 20-245) if ID()C already has this 
implied authority? 
The answer to this question is simple: the legislature did not "perform 
an idle act by enacting a meaningless provision." Roberts v. Board of Trustees, 
Pocatello School District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2000). 
Instead, the legislature did what only the legislature can do - it passed laws 
which expressly and specifically raised revenue for Irxx::: as part of the 
legislature's exclusive constitutional mandate to raise revenue and support 
the state's penal institutions. ID()C's raising of revenue without express 
statutory authority invades the province of the legislature. 
B. IIX)C IS NOI' ENTITLED 'ID CDSTS AND FEES 00 APPEAL. 
ID()C requests an award of costs and attorney fees on this appeal. 
Respondents' Brief, pgs. 39-40. ID()C is entitled to neither. 
1. IIX)C Is Not Entitled To An Award Of Costs On Appeal. 
Costs are awarded under Idaho Appellate Rule 40 to the prevailing party. 
ID()C is not, nor should they be, the prevailing party in this appeal. Indeed, 
as set forth herein, Searcy should be the prevailing party in this appeal and 
he should be awarded his cost from ID()C pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
2. IIX)C Is Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees On Appeal. 
"Under I.e. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41, an award of attorney fees may be granted 
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to the prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court is left 
with the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation." Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 277, 
108 P.2d 417 (2005) (citation omitted). Likewise, awards of attorney fees under 
Idaho Code§ 31-3220A(16) must be premised upon a finding by the court that 
the action "is frivolous or malicious." 
"Legal arguments that are supported by a good faith argument for the 
extension or modification of the law in Idaho are not so plainly fallacious 
to be deemed frivolous." Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho at 277, 108 P.2d 417 
(citation omitted). "We also recognize that inmates in the custody of the ID'JC 
generally do not have access to a law library and, therefore, cannot conduct 
extensive legal research on the theories they present." Id. 
Searcy's appeal is supported by a good faith argument for the extension 
or modification of the law in Idaho and is not so plainly fallacious to be deemed 
frivolous. Indeed, Searcy should prevail on this appeal. ID'JC is not entitled 
to an award of attorneys fees. 
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II. CCNCLUSIOO 
The district court erred in issuing the judgment and orders awarding summary 
judgment in favor of IDJC as to Count I of the Civil Complaint. These orders 
and judgment should be reversed. 'As set forth herein, this Court should award 
summary judgment in favor of Searcy as to Count I of the Civil Complaint and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. Searcy 
should be awarded his costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of June, 2014. 
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